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BOOK REVIEWS
Competition in International Business, edited by Oscar Schachter and Rob-
ert Hellawell. New York, Columbia University Press, 1981, 441 pp. Index.
$35.
This conference volume, sponsored by the Columbia University Center
for Law and Economic Studies, is a timely response to the increasing dissat-
isfaction of the developing nations with the dominant position of multina-
tional companies in their international business practices. It is not uncom-
mon, and quite understandable, for nations with lesser power to resent the
greater power of other nations and their instrumentalities-private and
public-operating in the recipient countries. It is, therefore, of prime im-
portance that the subject be explored in depth by experts. This has been
admirably accomplished in the essays, commentaries and observations of
the conference participants.
As stated in its preface, this book was inspired by recent efforts in the
United Nations to establish a code of conduct on restrictive business prac-
tices affecting international trade and development-a sort of international
antitrust law. The code was adopted in the United Nations in 1980. Al-
though not legally binding, it does serve as a consensus that anti-competi-
tive practices adversely and markedly affect international trade and eco-
nomic development. It forms the general framework, for the substantive
scholarship undertaken in the Columbia project.
The idea of such a code is not new. Its roots may be traced as far back
as the Atlantic Charter of 1941. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill, respecting their two governments, declared their desire and en-
deavor to further the economic prosperity of all states. To achieve this goal,
they deemed it necessary that all states enjoy access on equal terms to the
trade and raw materials of the world. In the master lend-lease agreements
(signed by the USSR, the UK, Belgium, Poland, the Netherlands, Greece,
Czechoslovakia, Norway and Yugoslavia), the U.S. provided that the final
settlements should not burden commerce, but should promote mutually ad-
vantageous economic relations between states and the betterment of world-
wide economic relations. They agreed to the aims of elimination of all
forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, the reduction
of tariffs and other trade barriers, and to all of the objectives set forth in
the joint declaration of Roosevelt and Churchill. This agreement was fol-
lowed by the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, which established the In-
ternational Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, in which United States membership was authorized by
Congress in the Bretton Woods Agreement Act of July 31, 1945. While
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concentrating on problems of international money and finance, the Final
Act of the Conference, containing the fundamental concepts embodied in
the prior conferences, included a reference for reducing obstacles to inter-
national trade and set the stage for the adoption by the Dumbarton Oaks
draft of a proposed United Nations. These concepts were broadened by the
adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945.
It is against this back-drop of U.S. initiative and leadership in post-
World War II international conferences that the Economic and Social
Council of the UN began its consideration of what was to emerge as a
proposed International Trade Organization, the Havana Charter (again put
forth by the United States). Articles 46-54 dealt specifically with curbing
restrictive business practices. Due to Congressional opposition, the U.S.
denied final approval, and the proposed I.T.O. was aborted.
This historic perspective is essential to an understanding of Schachter
and Hellawell's conference volume and, as brought out by a number of the
participants, the need for a continuing (or perhaps, revived) U.S. leader-
ship. This leading economic role is imperative because of the dominant posi-
tion of the U.S., particularly vis-a-vis the developing nations. In this, the
cooperation of U.S. multinational companies is a key factor. There are signs
that this effort has begun. Thus, the Columbia volume edited by Schachter
(Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law) and Hellawell (Professor of
Law at Columbia) comes at an opportune time in the fast-moving relations
between the U.S. and other countries.
The problem of restrictive business practices has a different dimension
from the problem as it was considered in the post-war conferences. The
proliferation of multinational companies, brought about in large part by
technological advances, has created specific problems in the developing
countries which must be addressed.
The tone of the book is set by N.T. Wang in his introductory essay
"Analysis of Restrictive Business Practices by Transnational Corporations
and Their Impact on Trade and Development." He emphasizes the new role
of the transnationals as one of the appointed agents of development, requir-
ing an adjustment by them as well as a new approach by governments.
Such an adjustment by the transnationals is crucial not only to their future
relations with the lesser developed countries (LDCs), but also to the LDCs'
attainment of their own aspirations.
Wang's essay leads to the related aspects which in the form of com-
mentaries and discussions, follow each of the six subsequent principal es-
says: "Control of Terms and Conditions for International Transfers of
Technology to Developing Countries," by Douglas F. Greer; "Restrictive
Business Practices in the International Transfer and Diffusion of Technol-
ogy," by Sigmund Timberg; "Economic and Political Characteristics of
Cartel and Cartel-like Practices," by Robert E. Smith; "International Car-
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tels and Their Regulation," by James A. Rahl; "Merger Control in West-
ern Europe: National and International Aspects," by Kurt Markert; and
finally, "The Seeking of a World Competition Code: Quixotic Quest?", by
Joel Davidow. These essays are subjected to close scrutiny and dissection
through Commentaries and Discussion by such recognized authorities as
Mark Joelson, David Gill, Walter Glass and others who have contributed to
the stimulating coverage of a subject which is always at the forefront of
U.S. international trade relations (the individuals are listed on pages 429-
432). One can only be impressed with their treatment of a complex subject
which is never free from controversy.
Perhaps the most important essays are those dealing with the transfer
of technology, a subject which vitally concerns the foreign policy of the
United States. Greer, drawing on his rich experience as Consultant to
UNCTAD and service with the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, has
given us a thorough coverage of the issues raised, and perhaps has provoked
the liveliest of the comments. A major point is that restrictive business
practices, if left unchecked, impose excessive and needless costs on the
LDC's receiving technology due to an imbalance in bargaining power. This
is not surprising since the principle of the use or abuse of power is reflected
throughout national as well as international restrictive business practices.
Because, as Greer points out, the adverse conditions imposed on LDCs, es-
pecially in the nonconventional and non-competitively supplied technology,
arise mainly from the structural circumstances, corrective measures to im-
prove the lot of the LDCs should focus on structural remedies. Curbing
international mergers (e.g. Bayer of Germany and Miles Laboratories of
U.S.), abolishing advanced-country cartels, expanding the international ju-
risdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws, and divesting domestic monopolies of
their large foreign subsidiaries are the major policies Greer outlines. This
reviewer whole-heartedly agrees with him that the most effective way to
improve the terms for recipients is to change the structure of industries so
that there are potentially more independent suppliers of the technology.
Timberg's essay, together with Greer's, forms a complete blend of
treatment on restrictions in technology-licensing arrangements in the trans-
fer of technology. Timberg is an old hand at international antitrust matters
and international trade in general. Therefore, it is not surprising, that his
article is scholarly, and, at the same time, pragmatic. Since much of tech-
nology transfer is in the form of licensing, this aspect treated by Timberg
takes on special significance.
The two essays which follow deal with cartels. A cartel is described as
"like a labor union. . . a political institution with economic consequences",
and following Heinrich Kronstein, is defined as an association wherein the
"members impose parallel restrictions upon their conduct, that have the ef-
fect of market regulation." As used by Smith, cartel encompasses "a broad
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
array of techniques to coordinate horizontal interfirm activities." Cartels
are an amalgam of goals, coordinating devices and operational techniques.
His emphasis is on understanding the nature of market power. He deals
incisively with the drive initiated by the LDCs toward a "New Interna-
tional Economic Order." Smith's graphic illustration of the four compo-
nents of market power is instructive. He has written extensively on cartels
and international competition policy, and his coverage of the economic and
political characteristics of the cartel demonstrates his rich governmental
experience.
Rahl deals with the regulation of international cartels essentially pri-
vate in nature, but apparently he cannot refrain from stating his opinion
that restrictive practices created by various governments interfere more
with free trade than do private cartels. In the examples that he cites this
may be true, but there may be instances where, in the opinion of this re-
viewer, that is not so. This is not the place to take issue with Rahl, since he
touches this aspect very lightly and it does not form part of the essential
core of his study. Rahl demonstrates how cartels thrive when antitrust laws
are ineffective or absent, and he traces the international impact of U.S. and
European Economic Community antitrust laws against cartels. In his sec-
tion on limitations on the effectiveness of antitrust law, he really gets into
the meat of the legal questions rather than the economic issues, covering
international procedure and enforcement, jurisdiction and discovery. This
aspect is of special interest to those of us who are engaged in international
legal practice.
Kurt Markert, in his review of European merger law, covers the laws
of the Federal Republic of Germany (Sections 23-24 of the Act Against
Restraints of Competition--considered the most sweeping merger law in
Europe), France (The Act to Control Economic Concentration and Prevent
Unlawful Cartels and Abuses of Dominant Positions, 1977), the United
Kingdom (included in the Fair Trading Act of 1973), the European Coal
and Steel Community (E.E.C., Articles 85-86 of the E.E.C. Treaty)-all of
which differ substantially from U.S. merger laws.
Davidow's scholarly essay (the final one in the book) on international
codes of conduct and conventions deals primarily with the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and UN-OECD ef-
forts, culminating in the Transfer of Technology Code and the Restrictive
Business Practices Code, which function as voluntary guidelines. This re-
viewer tends to agree with the view of Seymour Rubin, a participant in the
Columbia Conference and a prolific writer on international trade, in his
review of "Legal Problems of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enter-
prises", Vol. I, edited by Norbert Horn in 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 191, 193
(1982): ". . . The relevance of codes to improvement of the economic and
social circumstances of the developing nations is somewhat in doubt." How-
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ever, such codes as evolving documents serve to focus attention, of which
this book is an example, on the matters which must be addressed. In this
connection, the wise words of Oliver Wendell Holmes are relevant: "I find
the great thing in this world is not so much where we stand as in what
direction we are moving."
This wealth of material is not conducive to easy reading or analysis. It
is obviously not intended as such, and is not recommended for other than
the academic expert in the field, the governmental official involved in inter-
national antitrust matters or the legal practitioner in this speciality. The
subject, "Competition in International Business," cannot be simplified, but
it is a mark of great professional skill that the eminent editors of this out-
standing study have organized this volume into essays, commentaries and
discussion which tell the story so completely and articulately. In this sense,
it joins the hope for international trade that a great statesman cherished
many years ago: "The spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the man-
ners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humours which have so
often kindled into war." - Alexander Hamilton, 1787.
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